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Text of the Arab League Monitors' Report on Syria
Observer Mission of the League of Arab States to Syria
In the name of God the merciful and compassionate
Indeed, we offered the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, and they declined to bear it and feared it; but man [undertook to] bear it. Indeed, he was unjust and ignorant.
of the Head of the Monitors Mission of the Arab League to Syria
for the period 24/12/2011 to 18/1/2012
First: Legal basis:
1) The Arab League Council issued Resolution No. 7436 dated 2/11/2011 which adopted the Arab working plan attached to the Resolution, welcomed the Syrian government’s approval of this plan, and also stressed the need for it to abide by the immediate and full implementation of the articles of the plan.
2) On 16/11/2011, the Arab League Council issued Resolution No. 7439 approving the Protocol plan regarding the legal status and the tasks of the Arab League monitors’ mission to Syria which is tasked with making sure of the implementation of the articles of the Arab Plan for resolving the Syrian crisis and providing protection for the Syrian civilians. The Council asked the Secretary General of the Arab League to undertake that which he deems appropriate to appoint the head of the Arab League monitors mission, and conduct the necessary contacts with the Syrian government to sign the Protocol.
3) The Arab League Council issued Resolution No. 7441 on 24/11/2011 which called for the Secretary General to send the Arab League monitors mission to the Syrian Arab Republic to carry out its tasks in accordance with the Protocol as soon as it is signed.
4) The Syrian Arab Republic and the General Secretariat of the Arab League signed the Protocol on 19/12/2011, which included the setting up of the mission from Arab civilian and military experts who have been nominated by Arab states and non-governmental organisations concerned with human rights, in order to be sent to the territories of Syrian Arab Republic. It is noteworthy that the Article ‘Five’ stipulated that the mission would present periodic reports about the outcome of its work to the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Syrian government, in preparation to presenting them to the Ministerial Council via the Ministerial Committee concerned with the situation in Syria, in order to consider them and take necessary action in this respect.
5) The Arab League Council agreed on 20/12/2011 to appoint General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi from the Republic of Sudan as the head of the Arab League monitors mission.
Second: Setting up the Mission
6) The General Secretariat requested from the member states and the relevant Arab organisations that they provide their nominees to join the League monitors mission to Syria. Accordingly, the Arab League monitors mission was comprised of 166 monitors thus far, from 13 Arab states and 6 relevant Arab organisations.
Third: Visit by advance delegation of the General Secretariat to Syria:
7) As part of preparations for the Mission’s task, an advance delegation of the General Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab Republic on 22/12/2011 to discuss all the logistical preparations for the mission.
8) In implementation of the Protocol requirements, the Syrian governmental side stressed its readiness to provide all the facilities, allow the entry of technical equipment necessary for the operation of the mission, ensure safe freedom of movement for all its members in various Syrian territories, and not to place any security and administrative obstacles that would prevent the mission from accomplishing its tasks. It also stressed its commitment to guarantee the mission’s freedom to conduct the necessary interviews and meetings, provide full protection for its members, and also to allow the entry of journalists and Arab and international media to the Syrian territories in accordance with the rules and regulations that are applied in Syria.
Fourth: Arrival of head of mission to Syria and exploratory visits that he conducted:
9) General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi, the head of the Mission, arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on the evening of Saturday 24/12/2011, and held a series of meetings with Mr. Walid al-Muallem, the Foreign Minister, and officials in the Syrian government, who stressed their readiness for full cooperation with the League mission, and their keenness to ensure success for its task and to overcome all the obstacles that it may face. The necessary logistical and security arrangements for the mission were also agreed.
10) The Syrian side stressed that there are some areas where the security protection forces would not be able to enter with the monitors out of fear that the citizens would attack them. The head of the mission considered that this would allow the mission to follow up with the citizens and opposition parties without government monitoring, thus removing the barrier of fear of any consequences that they might be afraid of as a result of communicating with the mission.
11) The head of the mission completed the technical preparations on the ground and obtained the necessary means of transport and communication equipment for starting the work of the mission. He also met members of the mission who successively arrived in Syria, and he briefed them about the duties of their task, and the articles which their work would be based upon in accordance with the Protocol. The mission members then took the oath relevant to the task, which was prepared by the head of the mission.
12) On 27/12/2011, the head of the mission, along with 10 monitors, conducted an exploratory visit to the city of Homs, taking into consideration that it is one of the hottest zones that has seen acts of violence and armed clashes between the Syrian army and opposition. There are still some security barriers which separate the districts.
13) As soon as the mission head arrived in Homs, he met the city’s governor who explained that it is suffering from an increase of acts of violence by armed groups, incidents of kidnapping, sabotage of governmental and civil installations, and a big shortage of foodstuffs due to the blockade imposed by the armed groups who are estimated to be 3000 persons. He stressed the failure of all attempts to calm the situation by clerics and city notables, and requested the possibility of tackling the issue of the soldiers and vehicles besieged inside Baba Amro district.
14) The mission visited some of the residential districts (Baba Amro, Karam al-Zaytoun, al-Khaldiya, al-Ghotah) without any security. It met a number of opposition citizens who explained the state of terror, blockade and acts of violence which they are suffering at the hands of the government forces. It witnessed evidence of destruction inflicted on districts on the outskirts. This coincided with heavy gunfire between the sides. The mission witnessed a heavy exchange of fire in Baba Amro between the army and the opposition. It also witnessed four military vehicles in some of the surrounding areas, which required returning to the headquarters of the governorate, and it was agreed with the governor to keep five members of the mission in Homs until the next day to conduct field work and meet as many citizens as possible.
15) As soon as the head of the mission returned from Homs, he held a meeting with the government side and asked them to withdraw the military vehicles from inside the city, stop the acts of violence, protect the civilians, end the blockade and provide foodstuffs, in addition to exchanging the bodies of those killed on both sides.
16) The Syrian side assured during the meeting that they would empty the cities and residential neighbourhoods of the prescence of weaponry, except three military vehicles that were broken down and besieged, in addition to one military vehicle being seized from the army by the armed groups. They requested the help of the mission to pull out and recover those vehicles, in return for the release of four persons, an exchange of bodies of those killed (5 from each side), and allowing the entry of basic foodstuffs for the population of the city, in addition to rubbish collection vehicles. It was agreed at the end of the meeting to arrange for another visit to Homs by the mission on the following day accompanied by Brigadier Hassan Sharif, the security coordinator on the government side.
17) During this visit, the mission got to know one of the leading figures in the opposition who works as a media official in the National Council. A prolonged discussion took place about the offer presented by the Syrian government, and the best way to implement this agreement. As a result, all the military vehicles were pulled out and recovered, and there was an exchange of bodies of those killed, the entry of trucks loaded with foodstuffs, and the release of three detainees and two women and they were handed to their families with the presence of the mission. This led to calming the situation inside the city.
18) Five days after the monitors were deployed in five zones, the Ministerial Committee asked the head of the mission to present a report about the mission’s task. He left for Cairo and presented a verbal report to the members of the Committee during their meeting on 8/1/2012. It was decided that the mission should complete its task, such that the head of the mission would present a report at the end of the period specified in the Protocol, which is 19/1/2012. After the head of the mission returned to Damascus to resume his tasks, the mission faced some difficulties from pro-government supporters and those of the opposition, especially after the statements following the Committee’s meeting and what was reported in the media. But this did not affect the mission’s work or the completion of its deployment over the various areas in a smooth manner.
19) During the period since the arrival of the mission and up to the date of this report, the mission received several letters from the Syrian Committee tasked with coordinating with the mission, indicating the material and human losses suffered by institutions of the Syrian government as a result of acts of sabotage – as described by them – and which affected - as they stated - all the vital and service fields of the state.
Fifth: The deployment of the Arab League mission of monitors to Syria:
20) The members of the mission were deployed over 15 zones covering 20 cities and districts throughout Syria, and this was done in accordance with the dates specified below. The reason for the variation in these dates is the weakness of the administrative and technical preparations, including the arrival of cars and persons. The distribution was balanced, as each zone was made up of about 10 people from various Arab nationalities. These groups were distributed inside the Syrian governorates and cities as follows:
On 29/12/2011, six groups moved to each of Damascus, Homs, the rural area of Homs, Idlib, Daraa and Hama.
On 4/1/2012, a group moved to Aleppo.
On 9/1/2012, two groups moved to each of Deir al-Zor and Latakia. But they returned on 10/1/2012 to Damascus because they were exposed to attacks that resulted in two monitors being injured in Latakia and material losses in cars.
On 10/1/2012, a group went to Qamishli and al-Hasakah.
On 12/1/2012, a group moved to the rural area of Damascus.
On 13/1/2012, four groups went to Suwaidaa, Albu Kamal, Deir al-Zor, Tadmur, al-Sukhna, Banias and Tartous.
On 15/1/2012, two groups moved to Latkia, al-Ruqqa and al-Thawra.
(Appendix 1: Detailed report explaining the number of monitors and their nationalities and places of deployment.)
21) The members of the groups were provided with the following:
Map of the area.
Code of conduct of the monitor.
Duties of the head of zone.
Some of the necessary technical equipment (computers, cameras, communication equipment .. etc.)
22) An operations room was also opened in the headquarters of the Arab League office in Damascus. This room operates round the clock and is directly connected to the operations room of the Arab League in Cairo, and to the various groups deployed in Syrian areas. The room receives daily reports from groups in the field and conveys the directives regarding following-up and monitoring. As a result of the numerous tasks, a support operating room was opened in the headquarters of the mission in Damascus, with the task of allocating persons to follow-up committees / a committee for detainees / media committee / finance committee, working in coordination with the main operations room in the Arab League office.
23) The mission in both Latakia and Deir al-Zor faced difficulties from pro-government citizens, especially in Latakia, as thousands of them gathered around the vehicles of the mission, chanting slogans in support of the President and slogans hostile to the mission. Things got out of control and an attack on the monitors took place, resulting in slight injuries to two of them and the total destruction of an armoured vehicle. The matter was dealt with through a contact made by the head of the mission with the Syrian Higher Committee that is tasked with coordinating with the mission. Nevertheless, the head of the mission ordered these two groups to return immediately to Damascus, and he met the Foreign Minister and presented a strongly-worded official protest. The Syrian side strongly condemned this incident and offered an official apology, explaining that what had happened was not at all deliberate. To stress this point, the Deputy Foreign Minister met the members of the Latikia group and explained to them that the Syrian government will act to remedy the problem immediately so as to ensure the safety and security of members of the mission wherever they are. He apologized to them for the unfortunate and unintended incident to which they were exposed. Afterwards, the members of the two groups were redistributed and sent to the new zones after a 4-day resting period.
Sixth: Implementation of the mission’s tasks in accordance with the Protocol stipulations:
24) The head of the mission would like to stress that this observation which concerns the articles of the Protocol is a summary of the evaluations of the groups, and is based on what the heads of groups presented during their meeting with the head of mission on 17/1/2012.
Observation and monitoring of the extent of full implementation of the halt of all kinds of violence and from whatever source in cities and residential districts:
25) When the monitors were deployed to the various districts, they observed at the beginning of their work acts of violence from the side of the government forces and an exchange of fire with some armed elements in both Homs and Hama. As a result of the mission’s insistence on a halt to all acts of violence and the withdrawal of vehicles and equipment, this situation began to recede. Recent reports by the mission have recorded a noticeable quietness and self-control by these forces.
26) The mission in the Homs and Daraa zones detected acts of violence from the side of armed groups against government forces, which led to casualties, dead and wounded, among these forces. In some circumstances, the government forces resorted to violence as a reaction to attacks against its personnel. The monitors noticed the use by armed groups of thermal heat-generating bombs and armour-penetrating shells.
27) The mission witnessed in the areas of Homs, Idlib and Hama acts of violence that affected the government forces and citizens, resulting in many killed and wounded, such as the incident of bombing a civilian bus that led to eight people killed and others wounded including women and children, and the blowing up of a train carrying diesel fuel. In addition to other incidents in Homs there was the destruction of a bus belonging to the police forces, with two of them killed. A pipeline carrying fuel and some small bridges were also blown up.
28) The mission noticed that false statements were issued by various quarters about explosions and acts of violence in some areas. When monitors went to these areas to verify the matter, it became clear that those statements were baseless.
29) The mission also notes, on the basis of reports received from teams in the field, that there are media exaggerations on the nature of incidents and the numbers of killed and injured as a result of the incidents and demonstrations seen in some cities.
Verifying that Syrian security forces, in addition to the so-called ‘Shabeeha gangs’ do not attack peaceful demonstrations:
30) The recent reports received by the mission from the heads of teams in the field, in addition to their testimonies in the direct meeting that took place with the head of mission on 17/1/2012 in order to prepare this report, are that there were peaceful demonstrations in some areas by supporters of the regime and the opposition, and none of these demonstrations were attacked, except for some frictions which took place towards the mission and between the regime supporters and opponents which did not result in any losses [of life], since the last presentation given before the [Arab League] Ministerial Committee regarding Syria at its meeting on 8/1/2012.
31) The reports and testimonies of the heads of sectors stressed that the oppositionists among the citizens inform the mission when they rally and use it as a cover, thus preventing the security forces from dealing with them. But this phenomenon is beginning to disappear gradually.
32) The mission also received requests from opposition citizens in Homs and Daraa for the mission to stay and not leave. This may be due to their fear of attack after the mission leaves.
Verifying the release of those detained because of the current events:
33) The mission received statements from quarters outside Syria stating that the number of Syrian detainees is 16237. It also received statements from the internal opposition that say that the number of detainees is 12005. The teams in the field checked these figures, and it was found that there are discrepancies in the lists, incomplete and inaccurate information, and names are repeated. The mission is in touch with the government bodies to find out the truth about these figures.
34) The mission handed the Syrian government all the lists it had received, from the Syrian opposition inside and from outside Syria, and called for the release of these detainees in compliance with the Protocol.
35) On 15/1/2012, President Bashar al-Assad issued a legislative decree which offered a general amnesty for all the crimes committed in relation to the events that have taken place since 15/3/2011 and until the date of the decree. Implementing this decree, the relevant government authorities are releasing detainees in various areas in batches, unless they were charged with other crimes. The mission is supervising the process of release and is following up the completion of this issue with the government side in full and active coordination with the government.
36) The Syrian government reported on 19/1/2012 that 3569 detainees were released from the military and civilian prosecution services. The mission verified the release of 1669 of these detainees so far. It is still following up this issue with both the government and the opposition, while stressing to the government side that the detainees should be released in the presence of monitors in order to document the event.
37) The mission found that the total number of detainees that the Syrian government reported it has released to date, is as follows:
Before the amnesty decree: 4035 detainees.
After the amnesty decree: 3569 detainees.
So the total of those have been released according to the government is 7604.
38) The mission checked whether the number of detainees that have been released is correct, and found the following:
Before the amnesty decree: 3483 detainees.
After the amnesty decree: 1669 detainees.
So the total of those who have been verified as having been been released is 5125, and the mission is continuing the processes of verification and follow-up with the Syrian government in order to release the others.
Verifying the withdrawal and ending all armed manifestations from cities and residential districts that have witnessed or are witnessing demonstrations and protest movements:
39) The mission verified through the reports of heads of teams in the field, and on the basis of the direct meeting with all the heads of teams which took place on 17/1/1012, that all the military vehicles, tanks and heavy weapons were withdrawn from inside the cities and residential districts. There is still a security presence in the form of sand barriers and some check-points in front of important buildings and squares, but these check-points do not interfere with the citizens. It is worth mentioning here that during the meeting which the head of the mission had with the Syrian Minister of Defence on 5/1/2012, the Minister confirmed for him that he is prepared to accompany him to all the places and cities which the head of mission specifies and where the mission suspects that the military prescence continues and has not pulled out yet, so that he would give his orders there and then, on the spot, to remove the violation immediately.
40) There is a presence of armoured vehicles (troop transporters) at some check-points, one of them in Homs and some are in Madhaya and Zabadani in Rif Damascus [the rural district surrounding the capital]. These have been reported, and have been removed from Homs. It has also been confirmed that the residents of Zabadani and Madhaya reached a bilateral agreement with the government which led to the withdrawal of these check-points and vehicles.
Verification of the granting by Syrian government of licences to Arab and international media, and verifying that they are allowed free movement throughout Syria:
41) The Syrian government stressed, as stated by its Media Minister, that it had granted approval to 147 various Arab and international media since the beginning of December 2011 until 15/1/2012. Out of these, 112 media organisation have entered Syria, in addition to 90 others that are accredited in Syria and are operating through their correspondents on a continuous basis.
42) The mission has followed up this issue and observed 37 Arab and foreign media and a number of journalists in a number of Syrian cities. It has also received some complaints that indicate that the Syrian government granted some media licences for work for 4 days only, which is not enough from their point of view. In addition to not allowing them to be present inside the country until they specify their destination and getting another approval, and preventing them from going to some areas. On the other hand, the Syrian side stressed that it is granting media licences for work for 10 days, which can be renewed.
43) Reports and testimonies have pointed to the existence of constraints by the government on the movements of media in the areas of the opposition, which forced these journalists to move behind the mission in many cases in order to carry out their tasks.
44) The city of Homs saw one incident of the killing of a French journalist who worked as a correspondent for the France 2 Channel, and another journalist of Belgian nationality was injured. The government and the opposition have exchanged accusations of the responsibility of each of them for the incident, and statements of condemnation were issued by both sides. The government side set up an investigation committee with respect to this incident to find out its cause. It is noteworthy that that the reports of the Mission in Homs indicate that the killing of the French journalist was due to the firing of mortar shells by the opposition.
(Appendix 2: Inventory of media that have been observed, and the media that have entered Syria according to official reports.)
Seventh: Obstacles which the mission faced
The Monitors:
45) In some cases, the nomination of experts in the field of monitoring who are capable of shouldering responsibility and have previous experience in this field, did not take place.
46) Some monitors did not appreciate the level of responsibility they were shouldering and the importance of putting Arab interest above personal interests.
47) During work on the ground, it was noticed that some of the observers were unable to confront and cope with difficult situations that are regarded part of their tasks. It should be pointed out that the nature of these tasks requires the monitor to have specific qualities and specialization.
48) Some of the monitors participating in the mission are advanced in age, and some suffer health problems which prevent them from carrying out their tasks.
49) 22 monitors apologized for not being able to complete their tasks for personal reasons, and some others did so for pretexts that were not acceptable to the head of mission, some of whom had their own special agenda.
(Appendix 3: Inventory of the names of monitors who have apologized for not being able to continue work in the Arab League monitors’ mission.)
50) Some monitors did not abide by their duties and violated the oath they had given. They contacted officials in their states and conveyed what was going on in an exaggerated manner, thus resulting in those officials getting a grim picture of the situation and an inappropriate assessment.
51) Some monitors in the zones demand being given accommodation similar to that of their colleagues in Damascus, or a payment that corresponds to the difference in accommodation as a result of the variation in hotel grade, or to request staying in Damascus. These are matters which do need to be commented upon.
52) The very tense events in some places, and the fear of some monitors to conduct their tasks in such environment, and the lack of bullet-proof cars for all places and bullet-proof vests, all these adversely affected the performance by some monitors of their duties.
Comment of the Head of Mission
53) Some of the monitors, unfortunately, considered their presence in Syria as a leisure trip. But they were surprised by the reality and the deployment to the zones, their presence at stations outside the capital and the difficulties that they faced and were unexpected by them.
54) Some monitors were unfamiliar with the area and its geography, and the lack of bullet-proof cars and protective vests had a negative impact on the spirit of some monitors.
55) The provocations which some monitors faced from the opposition or government supporters among Syrian citizens also had a negative impact on them.
56) Despite all these remarks, the performance of many monitors was distinguished and deserves praising and appreciation. Those who have had difficulties will improve with practice.
Security constraints:
57) Despite the welcoming received by the mission and its head from the government side, and their continued emphasis that no security constraints are imposed on the mission that would hinder its movements, the government side has tried to deal with the mission with a well-planned strategy in an attempt to limit its ability to go deep into various areas, and to keep it busy with issues that are of concern to the government side. But the mission resisted this method and dealt with it in such a way as to achieve its tasks in the required manner, and it overcame the obstacles that faced its work.
Means of communication:
58) The mission communicates with the various groups through the Syrian local network, including mobile phones and Fax. These communication means are exposed to breakdown sometimes, thus preventing contact with various groups.
59) The mission received 10 Thuraya [satellite] phones, and they are of the type that is difficult to use inside buildings due to the difficulty in reception of satellite signals. As a result, they were not used in sending the daily reports, and normal phones and fax were used, which are insecure means.
60) The communication equipment that was accompanying the Qatari monitors was held up at the Jordanian borders despite the request by the head of mission to the Syrian side that they should be allowed to enter. Even if they had been allowed to enter, they would have been insufficient to serve all the places and stations.
61) The mission does not have walkie-talkie communication equipment for contacts between members of a single team. The Chinese embassy provided ten of these as a present to the mission, and they were used in three zones only.
62) The internet service is not available in some areas, and it is not regular in some other areas, including the capital.
63) No monitoring cameras that are attached to cars were available. They would have facilitated the task of the monitor in dangerous areas.
Means of movement:
64) The total number of cars used by the mission is 38 (of which 23 are bullet-proof and 15 are not bullet-proof). 28 of them are 4x4, and 10 are saloon cars. It should be noted that the mission’s task requires that all the used cars should be 4x4 and bullet-proof due to the nature of the task. The number currently available is not sufficient for the mission, especially for movement inside very tense areas.
65) The mission rented a number of cars in the local market at the beginning of its deployment in order to use them for monitoring work. But due to some of the incidents of riot that the teams on the ground faced, the hiring companies withdrew their cars out of fear for their safety and the safety of their drivers.
66) The mission faced the problem of providing drivers because of the objection by opposition groups to the entry of local drivers into their areas as they are considered to be connected to security forces. The monitors were therefore forced to drive the cars by themselves.
67) Some monitors requested that they use the cars which their states had sent. This was refused by the head of mission, and the distributed the cars in accordance with the need of each sector.
(Appendix 4: Inventory of the number of cars, their types, places where they are distributed, and the name of states which sent them.)
The Media
68) The mission has faced a vicious media campaign since the start of its work and until now. Some of the media published statements that have no basis and accredited them the head of mission. They also blew up the events in an exaggerated manner, thereby distorting the truth.
69) This kind of fabricated media coverage contributed to increasing the tension among the Syrian people and harmed the work of the monitors. Some of them were used to tarnish the reputation of the mission and its head, and tried to sabotage the task.
Eighth: Essential needs of the mission in the case of renewal:
100 additional monitors, who are young, and preferably military.
30 bullet-proof cars.
Light protective vests.
Camera equipment for mounting on cars,
Modern communication equipment.
Night and daytime binoculars.
Ninth: Assessment:
70) The aim of the Protocol is the protection of Syrian citizens through the commitment of the Syrian government to stop the acts of violence, release the detainees, and the removal of the prescence of all weaponry from the cities and residential districts. This should be a stage which has to lead to a dialogue between the Syrian sides, and embarking upon a parallel political process, otherwise the term of this mission would be prolonged without achieving the desired results on the ground.
71) It has been proved for the mission that there is an armed element that has not been addressed by the Protocol. It is no doubt a development that has emerged on the ground as a result of the excessive use of force by the government forces before the mission was deployed, when they confronted the protests that called for the downfall of the regime. This element in some zones sometimes attacks the Syrian security forces and citizens as a reaction that is also confronted with a violent reaction by the government, with innocent civilians paying the price and resulting in the end in a number of people killed and wounded.
72) The mission noticed since its deployment inside Syria that the opposition welcomed it and its members. There was a sense of security among the citizens as a result of the presence of the mission, so they came forward with their demands despite the fear among the opposition in the past of dealing openly because of the fear of arrest that existed before the arrival of the mission in Syria. This excludes the period that followed the announcement of the recent statement of the Ministerial Committee and the events which took place, though their severity have gradually reduced.
73) The mission also noticed a positive response from the government side to make its task succeed and overcome all obstacles that it may face. It facilitated conducting meetings and interviews with al parties, and did not impose any constraints on the movements of the mission and its meetings with Syrian citizens, whether they are opponents or supporters.
74) The mission sensed in some cities a state of severe tension, injustice and coercion that the Syrian citizens are suffering, but they have a conviction about the need to resolve the Syrian crisis in a peaceful way and within the Arab framework, without internationalization, so as to be able to live in peace and security, and so that the process of reforms and desired change be achieved. The mission was informed by the opposition, especially in Daraa, Homs, Hama and Idlib, that part of the opposition has resorted to arms as a result of the suffering by the Syrian people caused by oppression and despotism of the regime and the corruption that has spread to all sectors of society, in addition to the practices of torture by the security forces and the violations of human rights.
75) There are incidents that have started to emerge and constitute a development that could lead to further rift and bitterness among the sides, with grave consequences and losses in lives and property. These are the explosions that have included some buildings / trains carrying fuel / diesel fuel carrying vehicles / police forces / the media / pipelines. Some of these are acts which the Free Army organisation has claimed responsibility for, and others are carried out by other armed groups belonging to the opposition.
76) The mission abided strictly by implementing its task in accordance with the stipulation of the Protocol, through living with daily reality on the ground, in total neutrality and independence, so as to ensure transparency and honesty in monitoring the reality despite the difficulties that it faced and the undisciplined behaviour of some individuals.
77) The period for the operation of the mission, which was specified by the Protocol to be one month, is not enough for the administrative preparations, never mind the work of the mission which completed 23 days of actual work up to this date. It is definitely insufficient due to the numerous items which need to be verified, and the need to be present on the ground for a longer period in order to live among the people and monitor all the events that are taking place. It is worth mentioning that there are similar previous operations that took months and sometimes several years.
78) The credibility of the mission has become suspect for the Arab and foreign viewers and listeners who see some of the media that resort to using media technologies to distort the facts. This is something which is difficult to get rid of unless political and media support is provided to the mission and its task, even if some negative aspects emerge during its activity because this is a normal thing that happens for such missions and activities.
79) The mission came to Syria following the sanctions that were imposed on Syria to implement what had been agreed in the Protocol. Despite this, I found that we were welcomed by both the opposition and [government] supporters, and also the government. The question is raised, however, about how the mission would complete its task. Here we need to point out that the mission’s task as specified by the Protocol has undergone a change as a result of the development of events on the ground and reactions that are sometimes accompanied with violence by parties that were not addressed by the Protocol. These are all matters that require a development and change in the task of the mission. There is no doubt that the starting point in this context is the necessity for commitment by all sides to stop all acts of violence so that the mission can complete its task under a climate that helps it to pave the ground, in the end, for the political process.
80) If there is an agreement to renew the period of the mission’s operation, this would require providing equipment, means of communication and transport and all the tools that would enable it to complete its task on the ground.
81) On the other hand, any termination of the mission’s work after this short period since it started its operation will finish off the positive results – even if incomplete – that have been achieved until now. The situation may end up in chaos on the ground as long as all the sides of the crisis are neither ready nor qualified until now for the political process that is related to tackling the Syrian crisis.
82) Intentions towards the mission since it was set up have been insincere or, in a more comprehensive expression, not serious. It faced, before starting its work, and even before the arrival of its monitors, a vicious campaign that included the Arab League and the head of the mission, and has intensified after the deployment of monitors. The mission continues to suffer from the lack of political and media support that is needed to accomplish the task. If is to continue, then the objectives of the Protocol would only be achieved by providing this support and standing by the mission in order to make the Arab solution a success.
Tenth: Recommendations:
83) In view of the aforementioned, and the results achieved with regard to the articles stipulated by the Protocol and which the Syrian government pledged to implement, I see the following:
The need to support the mission with the administrative and logistic aspects that will enable it to carry out its duties. And also to provide the media and political support to create a favourable climate that contributes to carrying out the task properly.
The need to ensure the speeding up of the political process and the launching of national dialogue in parallel with the mission’s task in order to provide a climate of confidence that contributes to the success of the mission’s task and prevents prolonging its presence in Syria unnecessarily.
Head of Mission
(signature)
General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi
Appendices:
Appendix 1: Detailed report explaining the number of monitors and their nationalities and places of deployment.
Appendix 2: Inventory of media that have been observed, and the media that have entered Syria according to official reports.
Appendix 3: Inventory of the names of monitors who have apologized for not being able to continue work in the Arab League monitors’ mission.
Appendix 4: Inventory of the number of cars, their types, places where they are distributed, and the name of states which sent them.
From the document in Arabic.